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"LEASE AND OPTION" DEVICE FOR AVOIDING CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE INDEBTED-
NESS OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN KENTUCKY
By JonN C. LOVETT-
The Constitution of Kentucky forbids a county, city or
other taxing district from becoming indebted "for any purpose
in any manner" for an amount exceeding in one year the income
and revenue provided for that year without the assent of two-
thirds of the voters.2  That city and county school districts
are "taxing districts" within the meaning of this section is
apparently well settled.3 The provision in the constitution
suspending the limitations in emergencies 4 has been of little
assistance to school districts who desired new buildings either
because the old buildings were destroyed by fire, or because
the existing facilities and equipment were inadequate for an
expanding school. These are not "emergencies" within the
meaning of the constitution, such as will permit a non-conformity
with the above requirements. 5
When fire has destroyed existing buildings, where swelling
enrollments made additional equipment imperative, and where
'B. A. at Western Kentucky State Teachers' College 19&7-; LL. B.
at Harvard University 1940; Member of Marshall County, Western Ken-
tucky, and Kentucky State Bar Associations.
2 Kentucky Constitution, Sec. 157.
-'Brown v. Board of Education, 108 Ky. 783, 575 S. W. 612 (1900);
Board of Trustees v. Postell, 121 Ky. 67, 88 S. W. 1065 (1905).
Query whether this view would be open to attack on the basis of a
statement in the case of Hackensmith v. Co. Bd. of Edu. of Franklin
County, 240 Ky. 76, 41 S. W. (2nd) 656 (1931). In that case the court
said at page 82, "in other words, it is our conclusion that a board of
education of a school district, such as in the defendant, under the law
as It now exists, is only an administrative body with no power to levy
or collect taxes."
The conclusion that the district is not a "taxing district" probably
would not be accepted by the court. While the board itself does not
levy taxes, it can require the fiscal court, or municipal governing body,
to levy taxes for its benefit, and this power is sufficient to bring it
within the meaning of Section 157. See: City of Newport, Ex Parte,
141 Ky. 329, 332, 132 S. W. 580, 581 (1910).
'Supra, n. 2 at Sec. 158.
Nelson v. Bd. of Edu. of Williamsburg, 213 Ky. 714, 218 S. W. 808
(1926); Buckner v. Bd. of Edu. of Owensboro, 236 Ky. 768, 34 S. W.
(2nd) 236 (1930).
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old delapidated buildings have become dangerous fire-traps, the
problem of providing adequate facilities arises. As the floating
indebtedness of the district increases, and the general wealth
of the community decreases, the problem becomes more acute.
How that problem has been solved is the basis of this discus-
sion. In it we run the gauntlet of subterfuge, unwise public
expenditures, careless decisions, and puzzling judicial double-
talk.
In 1923, the County Board of Education of Davies County
was confronted with the task of providing a new school building
at a cost of $40,000. For some unexplained reason, it was "not
thought best to submit the question to the voters" in accordance
with the constitution. A plan was devised whereby the board
should convey to Hagen and Potts, a construction firm, nine
acres of land. The firm agreed to erect the building on the
land, lease the completed building to the board for school pur-
poses, the board in return promising to pay 13 semi-annual
rentals of $3,500 each and 2 of $2,500 each. After all the pay-
ments had been made, the firm promised to reconvey the
premises to the board.
A taxpayer's suit contesting the validity of the proposed
agreement brought the case before the Court of Appeals.0 It
was there held that the plan was invalid because it created an
indebtedness of $51,000 and this exceeded the anticipated
revenue for 1923. Many cases had held that promising to pay a
large sum in small annual installments is incurring a debt for the
entire sum.7
The real basis of the court's opinion seems to be that if this
plan, ingenious as it is, were approved, the protection given the
voters by the constitution against "excesses and extravagancies"
would be stricken from the fundamental law. The court seemed
to think that the constitution provided an adequate method of
meeting the situation, and it would be unwise to substitute a
dBillings v. Bankers Bond Co., 199 Ky. 490, 251 S. W. 643 (1923).
"Co. Bd. of Edu. of Christian Co. v. Bd. of Trustees of Hopkins-
ville, 154 Ky. 309, 157 S. W. 697 (1913); see Flanders v. Bd. of Trustees
of Little Rock School, 170 Ky. 627, 186 S. W. 506 (1916).
This court in the principal case took this view disregarding the
possible effects of a clause in the contract providing that in case of
default in the annual payments, the whole sum would become due, but
all above the constitutional limitation would be void. Thus it would
appear that the maximum legal obligation at any given time was within
the limitation.
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new device simply because it was "not thought best to submit
the question to the voters."
How the court changed its mind as to the importance of
protecting the people against unwise and extravagant spending
by public officials is seen in the decision in the case of Waller v.
Georgetown Board of Education.8 That case is the father of a
line of cases, each of which, as it was born, bore increasingly less
resemblance to its ancestor. Most of them are legitimate; a few
are bastards.
The plan in the Waller case demonstrated remarkable legal
ingenuity. There the trustees agreed to convey land on which
building had been begun to a private non-stock, non-profit
corporation, the incorporation of which was a part of the scheme.
The corporation agreed to pay $100,000 for the land (to raise the
sum bonds were issued) and the trustees agreed to use the money
in completing the building. The corporation would lease the
premises to the trustees for one year with option on the trustees
to renew for one year with option on the trustees to renew at
the end of each year. When all the bonds were paid, the corpora-
tion agreed to reconvey the premises to the trustees.
A taxpayer sought a declaration of rights under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. The court held that the contract
was valid because the debt created was only that of one year's
rental, and this was less than the anticipated revenue for that
year. The conveyance was an outright sale for full considera-
tion, and the trustees are not obligated to the bondholders nor
obligated to lease the premises for more than one year.
The court relied on the case of Overall v. City of Madison-
ville9 in which it was held that a city could erect a light plant
on a lot it did not own if the contract provided for the plant to be
erected piecemeal, so that the annual obligation would not exceed
the annual income. The court said as to the ownership of the
lot, that a lease to the city for one year with an option to renew
from year to year is not violative of the constitution.
The school district in the Waller case was a city school dis-
trict. The building had been begun and the scheme was invoked
to complete the building. The value of the property conveyed
was much less than the amount paid, thus the trustees made a
h209 Ky. 726, 273 S. W. 498 (1925).
'125 Ky. 684, 102 S. W. 278 (1907).
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good bargain. The bonds had been oversubscribed by the citizens
of the community, thus assuring an ample local market. These
characteristics of the father must be noted in order to ascertain
the peculiarities of the progeny.
The first extension of the doctrine arose in the next case in
which the plan was employed. 10 There the court had little dif-
ficulty in approving the use of the scheme by a county as dis-
tinguished from a city board of education.
Later the plan was approved in a case in which it did not
appear the bonds had been oversubscribed, nor did the corpora-
tion pay the money to the board, but rather paid for the con-
struction of the building itself." The court asked three ques-
tions. (1) Has the board been given power to convey land for
these purposes? 12 (2) May the corporation legally hold and
incumber the property? (3) Will the debt incurred be under the
constitution limitation? All three questions were answered by the
court in the affirmative.
* The plan received the summary approval of the Court of
Appeals in a case where the money desired could have been
secured by the board of education merely by asking the fiscal
court to increase the tax levy for one year.13 And where city
and county boards jointly owned property, the city board con-
veyed its share to the county board and it in turn conveyed to
the private corporation. This alteration in the facts does not
preclude approval by the court.
14
These extensions in the application of the plan resulted
from the court's careless approval of plans "substantially" the
same as that employed in the Waller case. In reading the cases,
one begins to wonder whether the idea in the case of Billings v.
Bankers Bond Co., supra, condeming the attempt to strike the
"prohibitions from our fundemental law" because it would lead
to "excesses and extravagancies", has not been abandoned
"Whitworth v. Breckinridge County Bd. of Edu., 225 Ky. 222, 7
S. W. (2nd) 1070 (1928).
U Kirkpatrick v. City Bd. of Edu. of Russellville, 234 Ky. S36, 29
S. W. (2nd) 565 (1930).
'This question is discussed more fully on page 7.
3Bridges v. Scott Co. Bd. of Edu., 235 Ky. 141, 29 S. W. (2nd)
594 (1930).
14 Button v. Trimble Co. Bd. of Edu., 235 Ky. 771, 32 S. W. (2nd)
345 (1930).
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entirely by the court. The court speaking through Judge
Thomas said,
"The school authorities of such districts in discharging their admin-
istrative duties have the right to adopt such methods for the successful
conducting of the school that are not expressly or by necessary implica-
tion prohibited by the constitution or a statute, and it is not for the
courts to determine whether in a given case they have pursued the
wisest and most prudent course."''
The court has held that using the "lease and option"
device for the purpose of paying an existing floating indebted-
ness is invalid.16 The court considered this scheme to be in sub-
stance a mortgage of the school property, and a school board
is not authorized by statute to mortgage school property. It is
submitted that the sale is just as complete in the cases where
the proceeds are to be used to pay existing debts, as where they
are to be used to pay for new buildings. The "mortgage" view,
it is submitted, is equally applicable to both. However, or other
factors in the case makes the result reached by the court seem
proper. 17 The court appears to have deviated from the course
thus established, however, in the case of Speer v. Ky. Children's
Home.18 There the children's home had become unable to
secure sufficient financial aid from private endowments. The
Department of Welfare wished to take the home under its wing,
but was prevented from doing so because the home owed a
$100,000 debt. The plan was used here, the property was con-
veyed to the newly formed corporation which issued bonds, and
paid off the debt. Then the corporation leased the property to
the Department of Welfare. Was this not substantially as much
a mortgage as that in the Hardin case? It is submitted that no
substantial distinction justifying opposite results is present.
The application of the principal was further extended in
Reneer v. Gentertown Educational Corporation.9 There it did
15 Holman v. Glasgow Graded Common School District, 237 Ky. 7,
at page 9, 34 S. W. (2nd) 733, 734 (1931).
1* Hardin v. Owensboro Educational Association, 244 Ky. 390, 50
S. W. (2nd) 86 (1932).
17 A statute then provided that in a sale of school property, the pro-
ceeds must be invested in other lots and buildings to be used for school
purposes, "and to be diverted to no other fund." This case involved a
city of the third class, and the statute applied only to third class cities.
Rothchild v. Shelbyville Bd. of Edu., 254 Ky. 467, 71 S. W. (2nd) 1033
(1934).
1"278 Ky. 225, 128 S. W. (2nd) 558 (1939).
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not appear that fair value was received for the property sold,2 0
and the money was used to "improve" existing buildings and
equipment, not to erect a new building, nor to complete a
partially constructed building. The court said,
"Even if we entertained greater doubt as to their soundness, we
would not be inclined now to overrule (the cases) and thus undo what
has been done in this case and in numerous other cases.",
When federal funds became freely available for use in the
construction of public works, the Kentucky General Assembly,
as the legislative bodies in many other states, provided means
for schools to benefit from those funds. 22  This statutory device,
which is essentially the same as the plan used in the Waller case
with the county or city substituted in the place of a private
corporation, was used in Davis v. Bd. of Edu. Newport.
23
Under the statutory plan, the city or county is a mere hold-
ing company and the bonds, which are in the nature of revenue
bonds, are not obligations of the city or county within the mean-
ing of the constitution. 24 The board of education submits plans
and specifications for the building, selects the site, and has
general administrative control over the construction of the
building.25 There must be a "lease and option", and if the
lease calls for rentals "continuing from year to year," the
aggregate of which is in excess of the constitutional limitations,
the contract is invalid.
26
An act passed by the General Assembly in 1934 declared
that title to all property owned by school districts and held for
school purposes shall be vested in the Commonwealth, and be
controlled by the Department of Public Property, a newly
created body consisting of the Governor and other state
"9253 Ky. 328, 69 S. W. (2nd) 718 (1924).
"Indeed it appears that fair value was not given. The price paid
was $8,000 which was to be used in improving existing inadequate
building and equipment. It is unlikely that the improvements would
cost more than the value of the existing building plus the value of the
land on which it was situated.
21 Supra, n. 19 at page 329.
2- Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Baldwin's 1936 Revision, Sec. 4421-1
to 4421-19.
"260 Ky. 294, 83 S. W. (2nd) 34 (1935).
21 Davis v. Bd. of Edu. of Newport, supra.
Franklin Co. v. Franklin Co. Bd. of Edu., 267 Ky. 554, 102 S. W.
(2nd) 1024 (1937).
" Fiscal Court of Jackson Co. v. Bd. of Edu. of Jackson Co., 268 Ky.
336, 104 S. W. (2nd) 1103 (1937).
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officials.27 This raised the question: Can a school board convey
property title to which is vested in the Commonwealth? It was
held in Bellay v. Bd. of Edu. of Ohio Co. that the statute did not
qualify the power of the school board to convey their property.2 8
The decision in that case said the board could buy, sell and con-
trol real estate for school sites, manage school property, and use
school funds in such ways as it should in the judgment and
discretion deem necessary and proper. This a far cry indeed
from the process of the vigilant court protecting the taxpayers
from "excesses and extravagancies."
The first volley was fired at the plan by Judge Thomas in a
dissenting opinion in Scott County Bd. of Edu. v. MeMillen.
29
In this case many improvements in school property were desired.
Instead of conveying one piece of land and letting it bear the
burden of improvements on it, the board conveyed three lots,
without direction as to what part of the proceeds of the sale
should be used to improve each lot, or indeed whether any of the
proceeds should be used on some of the lots. It was held that
this did not render the contract invalid, but Judge Thomas in
his dissenting opinion set out some appealing objections. He
first objected to expanding further the applicability of the plan.
He forcefully argued that each lot of land should bear its own
burden, and no piece of property be encumbered under a plan
to secure funds with which to improve a separate and distinct
piece of property. If this is allowed, it will "open the door for
an ambitious board to engage in the erection of a building or
other improvements * * * for beyond the necessities of the
case," and is against public policy. He thought it should be
declared against public policy for the board to encumber any
piece of property for any amount over and above the cost of the
improvements made to and upon it.
Certainly the conservatives will respect Judge Thomas' point
of view.
Another interesting point was involved in that case. The
contract provided that the private corporation would refund any
taxes paid by the bondholder on the bonds. The provision
included federal and state income and ad valorem taxes.
-"Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Baldwin's 1936 Revision, Sections
4399-19, 4618-44, 4618-47.
255 Ky. 447, 74 S. W. (2nd) 920 (1934).
1270 Ky. 483, 109 S. W. (2nd) 1201 (1937).
K. L. J.-5
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Obviously the purpose of the provision was to make the bonds
more attractive to investors. This provision was held not to
invalidate the scheme, because the broad powers vested in the
board would include the power to make this kind of agreement.
Here again Judge Thomas disagreed. His argument was that
the provision made uncertain the amount of liability the corpora-
tion had on the bonds, which in turn rendered the amount of
the annual payments uncertain and indefinite. Such uncertainty
probably will lead to an increased rental payment which either
the board must pay, or refuse to renew the lease, and in the
latter case, the bondholders are left in a very precarious position.
It seems that Judge Thomas has foreseen the difficulties
and has tried before it is too late to prevent the encroachment
of the sea by holding his finger in the dike. Summary dis-
position of cases in which the facts are "substantially" the same
as those in the Waller case merely by citing the Wailer case has
resulted in the present situation where the words "lease and
option" are on open sesame to ambitions, extravagant, thought-
less boards.
The show is not over. It could not have been long until
someone would seek to extend the plan to apply to a county which
wished to replace a burned courthouse. The county had statutory
authority to sell property and the plan was approved.3 0 One
city wished to build a new hospital, and employed the "lease
and option" device to obtain its construction. This plan was
approved. 3 ' And counties can use to secure funds for building
a hospital.32 The Department of Welfare used the scheme in
purchasing a children's home which was encumbered by a debt.
The plan provided funds to pay the debt.33
As the cases stand, it appears that almost any application
of the "lease and option" device will receive the approval of the
2 Sizemore v. Clay County, 268 Ky. 712, 105 S. W. (2nd) 841 (1937).
3 Booth v. City of Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325, 118 S. W. (2nd) 684
(1938): Plan held invalid. Changes made, plan approved, 275 Ky.
482, 122 S. W. (2nd) 99 (1938).
' State Bank & Trust Company v. Madison Co., 275 Ky. 501, 122
S. W. (2nd) 99 (1938); Board of Council of Danville v. Hospital Assoc.,
276 Ky. 304, 124 S. W. (2nd) 91, 92 (1939).
2 Speer -v. Ky. Childrens Home, 278 Ky. 225, 128 S. W. (2nd) 552
(1939); Emmons v. Bd. of Edu. of Lewis Co., 260 Ky. 17, 83 S. W. (2nd)
848 (1935).
Two cases from the same county decided the same day employing
the plan in improving two different lots by erecting school buildings.
In both cases, the contracts were approved.
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court. Few effective limitations remain, and the barriers erected
by the framers of the Constitution to prevent maladministration
have been swept away. An orgy of waste of public funds and
of the accumulation of ruinous indebtedness, and the spectacle
of school superintendents engineering the construction of a
building "to be a monument to himself " 34 seem in the offing.
"Pay as you go" is a sound business policy, but a bad
political policy for ambitions officers. The framers of the Con-
stitution intended that the taxpayers be protected, and be con-
sulted in the incurring of large indebtednesses. This protection
the court has swept away. Before the well becomes deeper and
more harm is done, the policy should be ended. Actually one
of two things must happen. Either the taxpayers must con-
tinue paying the rent and renewing the option, or the bond-
holders must seek what they can from the mortgaged premises.
And such premises as schoolhouses and courthouses do not
generally bring a high return on a forced sale.
It is submitted that this is an excellent field for remedial
legislation. In absence of this, it appears desirable that the
court follow the method employed in the case of Payne v. City of
Covington,35 and overrule the previous cases, but with the
reservation that the rights of all parties in those cases be pre-
served.
74 An actual happening.
- 276 Ky. 380, 123 S. W. (2nd) 1045 (1938).
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